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instant case is clearly consistent with both French and common
law principles and appears to be a commendable addition to the
Louisiana jurisprudence.
William Shelby McKenzie

THE PUBLIC RECORDS DOCTRINE, LIS PENDENS, AND CIVIL
CODE ARTICLE 150
Plaintiff filed suit for separation from bed and board against
her husband and obtained a preliminary injunction prohibiting
him from alienating community property. Neither the suit nor
the injunction was recorded in the mortgage or conveyance records of the parish where the community immovables were
located. Over a year later, the husband sold a lot belonging to the
community to a third person who had no actual knowledge of
the pending suit or of the injunction. Plaintiff sued to annul
the sale. The trial court dismissed on the ground that the public
records doctrine protected the third party purchaser. On appeal
to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, held, affirmed. A wife
cannot annul a sale of community property by the husband to one
who purchased in good faith, where notices of a pending action
for separation from bed and board and an injunction against
alienation of community property were not recorded in the
mortgage or conveyance records. Shapiro v. Bryan, 132 So.2d
97 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
Article 22661 of the Civil Code provides that unrecorded sales,
contracts and judgments shall be utterly null and void with respect to third party transferees. The Louisiana Supreme Court in
by the court in the instant case as cases where "the court concluded that there
had been no suitable consideration given or obligation incurred by the lessee for
the right to 'tie up' the lessor's property for the term of the lease." Long v.
Foster & Associates, 136 So.2d 48, 54 (La. 1961). When the holding in the instant
case is viewed in the light of the mineral lease cases, it appears that the court
may require, in enforcing a contract containing a conditional promise, some assurance that a party appreciated the fact that he was binding himself in return for
a conditional promise and seriously intended to be so bound. In the instant case
the facts afford no basis for believing that there was anything but a serious and
true intent on the part of the employer to bind himself as he did. The employer
was at least in an equal bargaining position with the employee. If the termination
clause were exercised, it also ended the obligations of the employer with respect
to the employee. It seems evident that the power of cancellation was simply an
inducement for the employee to undertake the employment.
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2266 (1870): "All sales, contracts and judgments
affecting immovable property, which shall not be so recorded, shall be utterly null
and void, except between the parties thereto. The recording may be made at any
time, but shall only affect third persons from the time of the recording."
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McDuffie v. Walker,2 in which the public records doctrine is generally said to have originated, interpreted this article literally,
adding that an unrecorded sale, contract, or judgment has no effect on the title of a third party transferee in the absence of
recordation, even if he has actual knowledge of the unrecorded
claim.8 The Revised Statutes 4 extend the public records doctrine
to any "sale, contract, counter letter, lien, mortgage, judgment,
surface lease, oil, gas or mineral lease, or other instrument or
writing relating to or affecting immovable property." Thus, the
public records doctrine, as founded on Article 2266 and elucidated
by McDuffie v. Walker, requires the recordation of a claim
against the immovable in order for it to affect third parties,
irrespective of their actual knowledge of the claim.'
Article 2453 of the Civil Code provides that the mere filing
of a suit affecting title to an immovable charges third persons

not parties to the suit with notice of a demand which might
affect title to the immovable.e However, Louisiana Act 22 of
19047 requires that a notice of lis pendens, i.e., notice of the pend2. 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100

(1910).

The plaintiff claimed title to property

under deed dated and recorded in 1907, acquired by him with knowledge of the
prior sale of the property to defendant in 1899, which was not recorded until
1908. The court declared the plaintiff the lawful owner of the parcel holding that
unrecorded sales have no effect on third persons.
3. See Ewald v. Hodges, 239 La. 883, 120 So.2d 465 (1960) ; Gulf Refining
Co. v. Bagby, 200 La. 258, 7 So.2d 903 (1942) ; Westwego Canal & Terminal Co.
v. Pizanie, 174 La. 1068, 142 So. 691 (1932); Louisiana Land & Pecan Co. v.
Gulf Lbr. Co., 134 La. 787, 64 So. 713 (1914) Washington v. Filer, 127 La. 862,
54 So. 128 (1911)
Riggs Cypress Co. v. Albert Hanson Lbr. Co., 127 La. 450,
53 So. 700 (1910) Graham v. Murphy, 126 La. 210, 52 So. 277 (1910).
4. LA. R.S. 9:2721 (1950) : "No sale, contract ... mortgage, judgment . . . or

other instrument relating to or affecting immovable property shall be binding on or
affect third parties unless and until filed for registry in the office of the parish
recorder of the parish where the immovable is situated. Neither secret claims,
nor equities, nor other matters outside the public records shall be binding on or
affect such third parties."
5. The purpose of the doctrine is to establish a dependable and functional
method by which a prospective purchaser can ascertain the validity of the title
to real estate on the strength of the record alone without any time-consuming
search for unrecorded rights or hidden equities. See Blevins v. Manufacturers'
Record Publishing Co., 235 La. 708, 105 So.2d 392 (1957) ; Watson v. Bethany,
209 La. 989, 26 So.2d 12 (1946) ; Schneidau v. New Orleans Land Co., 132 La.
264, 61 So. 225 (1913) : See Comments, 14 TUL. L. REv. 16 (1940), 12 TUL. L.
REV. 308 (1938).
6. LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 2453 (1870) : "The thing claimed as the property of
the claimant can not be alienated pending the action, so as to prejudice his right.
If judgment be rendered for him, the sales is considered as a sale of another's
property, and does not prevent him from being put in possession by virtue of such
judgment." See Lacassagne v. Shapuis, 144 U.S. 199 (1892) ;Wells v. Blackman,
117 La. 359, 41 So. 648 (1906).
7. La. Acts 1904, No. 22, incorporated as LA. R.S. 13:3541 (1950) provides:
"The pendency of an action in any court, state or federal, in the state affecting
the title, or asserting a mortgage or lien upon immovable property, shall not be considered or construed as notice to third persons not parties to such suit, unless a
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ing action affecting immovable property, be recorded in the'
mortgage or conveyance records in order to affect third parties.
In Soniat v. Whitmer the court upheld title of a vendee who
purchased during the pendency of a suit less where notice of lis

pendens was not properly recorded, even though the vendee had
actual knowledge that the suit was pending.9 Though a subse-

quent decision cast doubt on the latter holding,0 Article 3751 of
the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure," supplanting Act 22 of
2
1904, adopts the Soniat position.'

The public records doctrine applies to claims against immovables which arise out of contractual and judicial action.
However, it does not apply to rights arising by "operation of
law," such as rights of heirship, 3 rights in community propnotice of pendency of such action shall have been made, filed or registered, in
compliance with R.S. 13:3541-13:3543 [the articles setting forth the mechanics of
recordation]."
8. 141 La.. 235, 74 So. 916 (1917). Here, a third party purchaser sued to
enjoin defendant from seizing property bought by third party during litigation in
which defendant was successful in contest with plaintiffs' vendor over title. In
keeping with MeDuffie v. Walker the court held that even if the third party
knew of the litigation, the notice of lis pendens must be recorded to affect him
legally.
9. Thus, regarding the effect of actual knowledge of the claim on the part of
the third person had actual knowledge of the litigation there was no reason to
as is found in the area of the public records doctrine.
10. Richardson Oil Co. v. Herndon, 157 La. 211, 216, 102 So. 310, 312 (1924).
In determining whether an assignee, who, in "consideration" of the assignment,
had agreed to obtain the dismissal of a pending suit, had bought at his peril
and risk even though no notice of lis pendens was filed, the court held that when
the third person had actual knowledge of the litigation there was no reason to
resort to "constructive knowledge," i.e., notice by recordation under La. Acts
1904, No. 22. It has been suggested that the lis pendens statute applies only to
cases where constructive notice is necessary, and that Article 2453 is still applicable in cases of actual notice, even against third persons. See Comment, 12
TuL. L. REv. 318 (1938).
The decision in the Richardson case may stand for the proposition that the
assignee was a party to the litigation, thus making the statute inoperative by its
own terms, as the Us pendens statute requires recordation only for the pending
suit to affect persons not parties to the litigation. Parties to the litigation have
actual knowledge and are unaffected by non-recordation. If such an interpretation is valid, this case does not relate to the MoDuffie rule concerning persons
not parties to the transactions, nor to the Soniat case concerning persons not
parties to the pending suit.
11. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3751 (1960) : "The pendency of an
action or proceeding in any court, state or federal, in this state affecting the title
to, or asserting a mortgage or privilege on, immovable property does not constitute
notice to a third person not a party thereto unless a notice of the pendency of
the action or proceeding is made, and filed or recorded, as required by article
3752."
12. Id. Comment (b) : "This article is declaratory of the rule of Soniat v.
Whitmer . . . and is intended to overrule legislatively the contrary decision in
Richardson Oil Co. v. Herndon." However, the statute is similar in language to
the Ns pendens statute which was distinguished by Richardson, and it cannot
be said definitely that a similar interpretation of the new article is impossible,
although the comment makes this unlikely.
13. Legal heirs are vested by operation of law with their proper share of
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erty, 14 and certain privileges,

5

all effective against third persons

inheritances. Even though the purchaser relies on a judgment placing the vendor
in possession of property belonging to these heirs and not to the seller, he will
not be protected, though there is nothing in the record to give notice of the right
of the heirs. In Long v. Chailan, 187 La. 507, 175 So. 42 (1937), defendant, a
purchaser of land seized and sold to settle debts of Mr. Long after the death
of Mrs. Long, contended that the rule of McDuffie v. Walker protects the purchaser against the unrecorded claims of the heirs of Mrs. Long. The court declared
that "article 2266 of the Civil Code, or the doctrine of MeDuffie 'v. Walker, is
not to be construed so as to defeat the right of heirs who inherit from their
mother her half interest in the community property." Id. at 522, 175 So. at 48.
In Chachere v. Superior Oil Co., 192 La. 193, 187 So. 321 (1939) plaintiff heirs
attempted to introduce parol evidence that the sale of property to a co-heir by
their father was a simulation, after the vendee heir had sold to a third person
who had relied on the records which did not indicate that his vendor was heir
of the original vendor. The court held that after the property has passed into
the hands of third persons, evidence to vary the public records cannot be introduced. In this fact situation, the rights of the purchaser who relied on the public records were superior to those of the forced heir. In Thompson v. Thompson,
211 La. 486, 30 So.2d 321 (1947), where the heirs of deceased father attempted to
have a sale by him to a co-heir declared a simulation in defraud of their rights,
and the co-heir had granted an option contract to third person to purchase the
property, the court protected the rights of the heirs to the property. However,
it was noted in the dicta that had the option been acted upon and the sale completed, the heirs would have been estopped from asserting their claim.
14. Upon dissolution of the community by death of one of the spouses, the
heirs of the deceased are vested by operation of law with his half of the community, with the surviving spouse retaining authority over her helf. In Succession of James, 147 La. 944, 86 So. 403 (1920) the public records showed the
mortgagee to be a femme sole, when in fact she was married and property was
community property. The court held that the rights of the husband prevailed
and that the mortgagee was not protected by the public record doctrine. In the
case of Humphreys v. Royal, 215 La. 567, 41 So.2d 220 (1949), the defendant
purchased land by act of sale which stipulated vendor was a "single man," though
he was married at the time he bought the land, but had been subsequently
divorced, having failed to record the divorce judgment. In upholding the defendant's rights against that of a purchaser of the wife's community half, the court
declared that the unrecorded divorce judgment is null and void so far as its
affecting immovable property purchased by third parties who rely on the public
record. The resulting law seems to be that where the vendee is a man he is
presumed to be able to transfer title to the property regardless of his marital
status, as the man is head and master of the community and may alienate the
community property without consent of the wife. However, as the wife has no
such authority, it devolves upon the third person to ascertain the true marital
status of the female vendor. The public records doctrine will not protect the
good faith purchaser from the community property rights of the other spouse when
the vendor is female. See Daggett, Policy Questions on Marital Property Law
in Louisiana, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 528 (1953); Comment, 11 TUL. L.
REV. 389 (1937).
15. To be effective against third person, liens and privileges generally require
recordation according to the form prescribed in LA. CiviL CODE art. 3274 (1870).
However, certain privileges are by law effective without recordation. For example,
privileges for expenses of a last illness arising upon the death of the owner and
privileges for taxes are valid against third persons without recordation. LA.
CONST. art. XIX, § 19. Funeral charges, and law charges for settling succession,
and the right of the widow or minor heirs of the deceased to a thousand dollar
statutory allowance, need not be recorded to be effective. LA. CIVU CODE art.
3276 (1870). Material men and laborers have a claim effective for a certain
length of time without recordation. LA. R.S. 9:4801 (1950). As a consequence
the purchaser of immovables may be required to pay secret liens to acquire title
even though the records showed no outstanding equities. Washington v. Washington, 116 So.2d 125 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
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without recordation as there are no documents necessary to
establish the right. 16
Article 150 of the Civil Code 17 provides that the husband may
not alienate community immovables after the filing of a suit
for separation from bed and board "if it be proved that such
alienation was made with the fraudulent view of injuring the
rights of the wife." Prior to the instant case, Article 150 had not
been construed in a judicial decision. However, the French commentators, Aubry and Rau, suggested that a similar French
article is applicable only when both the vendee and the 8 vendor
conspire to defraud the wife of her community property.'
16. Those cases where faith in the records alone does not protect the purchaser, relying upon the public records are said to be those where property vests
by operation of law. Bishop v. Copeland, 222 La. 284, 62 So.2d 486 (1952).
Some courts and writers envision the concept underlying public registry requirements as a broad general principle and treat these areas as exceptions to that
principle. See Vell v. Canal Bank & Trust Co., 193 La. 142, 190 So. 359 (1939) ;
Cole v. Richmond, 156 La. 262, 100 So. 419 (1924) ; Hodgeson v. McDaniel,
233 La. 180, 96 So.2d 481 (1957) ; Comments, 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 548
(1957), 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 511 (1952), 24 TuL. L. REV. 375 (1950).
However, this view finds no basis in the legislation or the majority of the jurisprudence.
To call these areas "exceptions" to the public records doctrine, the doctrine
must be sufficiently extensive to include the areas of forced heirship and community property within the requirement of recordation.
Any doctrine which
would apparently include those types of rights must be one which holds that all
outstanding claims must be recorded to be effective against third persons, and the
fact that they may be rights created by operation of law is immaterial.
However, the leading cases which purportedly established these "exceptions"
give no such broad interpretation to the McDuffie doctrine. In Chachere v.
Superior Oil Co., 192 La. 193, 187 So. 321 (1939), the court declared: "The
doctrine of McDuffe v. Walkei . . . has no reference to an unrecorded title
acquired by inheritance." Id. at 199, 187 So. at 322. In Succession of James,
147 La. 944, 86 So. 403 (1920), the court held that the community property
rights of a spouse are not within the ambit of applicability of the public records
doctrine.
The court did not speak of these areas of law as exceptions, but rather areas
of law to which the laws of registry are not applicable. It seems the court's continual references to these areas as exceptions is not intended to enlarge the ambit
of the public records doctrine beyond that defined in the text, but the use of such
terminology is merely a convenient label.
17. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 150 (1870) : "From the day on which the action of
separation shall be brought, it shall not be lawful for the husband to contract
any debt on account of the community, nor to dispose of the immovables belonging to the same, and any alienation by him made after that time, shall be null,
if it be proved that such alienation was made with the fraudulent view of injuring the right8 of the wife." (Emphasis added.)
18. Article 150 is derived from French Civil Code Article 271: "Any obligation contracted by the husband on account of the community, and any alienation
by him of the immovables belonging to it, after the date of the order mentioned
in Article 238, shall be declared null, if it is afterwards proved that it was
made or contracted in fraud of the rights of the wife." (Trans. Louisiana Legal
Archives 1938). 5 AUBY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAISE 204, § 494
(4th ed. 1872) indicates that contracts entered into by the husband after the
filing of a suit for separation from bed and board may be annulled under Article
271 only "when they have been contracted or made in fraud of the rights of the
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In the instant case, plaintiff wife sought to annul the sale
executed during pendency of her suit for separation from bed
and board under Article 150 of the Louisiana Civil Code on the
ground that the sale was in fraud of her community property
rights. The court found that the vendee had no actual knowledge
of the suit and was himself innocent of any fraudulent intent.
The court pointed out that the public records did not reveal the
pending suit, although the wife could easily have protected her
interests by recording notice of the pending action. The opinion
reveals that the court did not choose to ground its holding exclusively on Article 150, but arrived at its conclusion after a
general examination of the public records doctrine in conjunction with Article 150. However, it appears that the decision
could have been reached by applying either Article 150 or the
public records doctrine alone, or by applying the rules of 1is
pendens.
Under the public records doctrine the injunction must have
been recorded to affect third parties. No such recordation was
made, so the third party was free to purchase. 19 Similarly, the
lis pendens statutes require recordation of the pending suit in
order for it to convey legal notice to third parties. As there was
no recordation of the separation suit, the third party purchaser
was unaffected by the outcome of the litigation.
The essential elements of Article 150 are the filing of the
suit for separation from bed and board, which gives rise to the
right of the wife, and the necessity that the alienation of community property be with the fraudulent view of injuring the
rights of the wife in the community. The court approved of the
Aubry and Rau position that fraud is present only where there is
conspiracy on the part of both the husband and the third party
transferee. However, it is arguable that fraud only on the part
of the husband should suffice. Certainly the article itself makes
no specific mention of the transferee and seemingly the phrase
"fraudulent view" refers only to the action of the husband. To
wife, and if the third parties with whom the husband has dealt have been accomplices of the fraud."
19. Disobedience of an injunction subjects the offender to contempt of court
charges, and allows for rescission of what was done in violation of the injunction.
LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3611 (1960) : "Disobedience of or resistance
to . . . a preliminary or final injunction is punishable as a contempt of court.
The court may cause to be undone or destroyed whatever may be done in violation of an injunction, and the person aggrieved thereby may recover the damages
sustained as a result of the violation." The effect of such a provision on the
public records doctrine, and its application to Article 110, are beyond the scope
of this Note.
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this problem is added the question of the effect of the lis penvdens statute, Act 22 of 1904, on the right arising under Article
150. It may be argued that the act did not affect the right
accorded the wife by Article 150, since it is akin to community
property rights which arise by operation of law and do not need
to be recorded in order to be effective. 20 Further, one who
fraudulently conspires to deprive another of immovable property
may not avail himself of the public records doctrine. 21 However,
it may be asserted that recordation is required. The right arising
under Article 150 is dependent upon the filing of the suit. As the
filing of the suit is now generally ineffective notice to third
persons of the pending action without recordation, one may
argue that the lis pendens statute modified Article 150 in the
same manner as it changed Article 2453. In view of the foregoing, it is submitted that Article 150 may be applicable in one
of the four following situations: (1) both the husband and the
third person conspire to defraud, and there is no need of recordation for the right to be effective; (2) fraud is required on the
part of both parties, but recordation is required in order for the
wife to attack the fraud; (3) fraud is required only on the part
of the husband, and recordation is required; (4) fraud is required only on the part of the husband, but no recordation is
required. In the context of the public records doctrine and
the lis pendens statute, any one of these four positions could be
supported by the language of Article 150. It is suggested that
the courts should attempt to select the interpretation of the
article which would accord with the most desirable practical
result.
The first interpretation gives no meaning to Article 150, as
the sale could be rescinded because of the fraud regardless of the
application of Article 150. The second seems equally unsatisfactory for the reason that Louisiana jurisprudence does not apply
the laws of registry when fraudulent transfers are involved.
The third interpretation would again give no effect to the article,
for upon recordation of the suit, the lis pendens statute would
provide protection for the wife even if the husband were not
20. The general rule seems to be expressed in Bishop v. Copeland, 222 La.
284, 292, 62 So.2d 486, 488 (1952) : "[T]he law of registry . . . is not applicable
when . . . a claim affecting the immovable has become vested in claimant by mere
operation of law."
21. As held in McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1910), fraud
cuts down all things. Where fraud is alleged and proved, failure to record is
immaterial to the rescission of the sale, contract, or judgment, or to the recovery
of damages.
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attempting to defraud her. The fourth interpretation would
provide the only solution giving the article vitality, in that it
would protect the rights of the wife in the community property,
even against innocent third party transferees, if the alienation
by the husband were made with the intent to defraud her. This
result would obtain neither under the law of registry nor under
an action to rescind an agreement on the grounds of fraudulent
conspiracy.
Whether such an interpretation is desirable requires a brief
examination of the policy considerations involved. Generally,
unrecorded rights in the community are protected against alienation, even to innocent third parties, as the importance of maintaining community rights seems to outweigh the importance of
protecting the titles of transferees. Such a view would necessarily underlie the fourth interpretation of the article. However,
it is nonetheless important that, where possible, innocent vendees should be unaffected by secret equities affecting title to the
immovable. In view of the fact that the wife in the instant case
could have easily protected herself by merely recording the suit
or injunction, and from the fact that the right arising under
Article 150 may be distinguished from other community property
rights which generally arise without judicial proceedings, in that
this right arises only upon filing of the suit, it is submitted
that the innocent vendee should have been protected. 22 Such a
view, of course, would lend no vitality to Article 150, as previously indicated. It is submitted that such a construction is in accord
with the general purpose of the lis pendens statute, which has
been held to have modified Article 2453 to the extent that the
filing of suit, generally, is insufficient notice of a claim against
immovable property. It would seem that the Iis pendens statute
would afford adequate protection for the wife without further
encroaching upon the laws of registry.
J. J. Graham
22. This situation may be analogous to that in Humphreys v. Royal, 215 La.
567, 41 So.2d 220 (1949), where the court held that the public records protected
the innocent third party purchaser against the community property rights of the
wife because she could have protected herself by the recordation of an available

divorce judgment. It seems that where some documentary evidence is available to
establish the right, failure to record such document prevents the rights arising
therefrom from being effective against third persons, even though where no such
document is available the right may be effective against innocent third persons
regardless of the registry laws.

